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1. Objective
This lecture explores the evolution and content of Neurocybernetics, its relation to 
Artificial Intelligence and their interrelations with Computer Science and Knowl-
edge Engineering.
We want to emphasize throughout the presentation the need to return in a system-
atic way to the original writings of the main authors, where one can find many of 
the basic ideas, which are still pending to be developed and which are a source of 
inspiration. We also want to emphasize the educational potentials these matters of-
fer for computing research curricula.
In dealing with the relations of Neurocybernetics to Artificial Intelligence, we shall 
make generous use of some ideas shared with our former and very good friend and 
colleague, Prof. Jos´e Mira Mira, who passed away unexpectedly and too early. 
What is presented here is dedicated to his Memory, and to his lively, strong and 
serious way to make cybernetic and computing science.
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1. The Original Components of Cybernetics
Neurocybernetics took off in the Forties although many of the basic ideas had been 
being managed in philosophic and scientific circles since the times of the Ancient 
Greeks. From 1943 to 1945, a kind of synergetic process was started up, triggered 
as the result of three basic pieces of work: Norbert Wiener, Arthur Rosemblueth 
and Julian Bigelow’s study (1943) on the nature of teleological processes where the 
crucial idea was that the relevant in a homeostatic process is the information return 
and not the energy return via the feedback loops (see figure 1).
Following this, came the work of the young British philosopher, Kenneth Craick, 
published in the form of a small book called On the Nature of Explanation in 1943. 
He offered a pursuit of a Theory of Knowledge which would be contrastable like 
any other Natural Science. He was not completely successful in achieving this aim 
but he did, however, establish the rational bases upon which all the theories and 
models of systems of artificial behaviour have since been built. Craick offered a 
clear and powerful framework within which to express the acquisition, processing, 
storage, communication and use of knowledge (see figure 2).
And third, the work of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts, A Logical Calculus of 
the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity, which was also published in 1943. They 
elaborated the concept of a “formal neuron”. Its response is, in fact, equivalent to a 
symbolic proposal with respect to the corresponding stimulus and which allows for 
a neural network to be considered as a logical system capable of handling symbols 
and elevating them to the level of the logic required for proposals. They came to 
the final conclusion that a network of formal neurons, with an effective infinite 
memory tape, can compute any number which is computable by a Turing Machine 
(see figure 3).
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Figure 1. Fundamentals of homeostasis and reactive agents.
Figure 2. Basis of Symbolic A.I. Agents and Robotics.
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In 1942 McCulloch met Norbert Wiener with their mutual friend Arturo Rosemblueth. 
The crucial paper for the emergence of Cybernetics was presented at the first Macy Foun-
dation meeting in New York City: Behaviour, Purpose and Teleology, published the follow-
ing year by Norbert Wiener, Arturo Rosemblueth and Julian Bigelow.
Figure 3. Origins of Connectivism.
Rosemblueth and McCulloch had reached with the Josiah Macy Foundation an 
important agreement to organize a yearly interdisciplinary meeting. Before they 
started, there was late in 1942 a meeting of engineers, physiologists and mathema-
ticians at Princeton, referred by Wiener in the Introduction of his book of 1949 
Cybernetics. There, McCulloch says, he met John von Neumann.
The Macy Foundation Conferences started under the name “Conferences on 
Circular, Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social Systems”, which 
was changed to “Conferences on Cybernetics” in 1949. The series of stimulating 
and constructive Conferences run until 1953. They established a new conception 
for treating living and non-living machines, which with more or less successes, fail-
ures and redefinitions came to our days. It would be fruitful to dig into that remark-
able source of ideas and inspiration, but only some of the Transactions are available. 
As Von Foerster said “The Conferences have became an oral tradition, a myth”. 
Today, the consequences of that myth can be found in McCulloch and other at-
tendants’ essays. Many of the attendants to the Conferences may be considered the 
real foundations of Cybernetics. Some names: W. Ross Ashby, Y. Bar-Hillel, Julian 
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Bigelow, Jan Droogleever-Fortuyn, W. Grey Walter, Rafael Lorente de N´ o, Don-
ald MacKay, Warren McCulloch (Chairman of the Conferences), J.M. Nielsen, 
F.S.C. Northrop, Linus Pauling, Antoine Remond, Arturo Rosemblueth, Claude 
Shannon, Heinz Von Foerster, John Von Neumann, Norbert Wiener. From that 
time, McCulloch was advisor and friend of the operational research pioneer Staf-
ford Beer.
From the Macy’s Conferences on, there were a number of crucial subjects and 
problems, raised and discussed in the many sessions. Among them, there were the 
concepts of regulation, homeostasis and goal directed activity, the transmission of 
signals and communication in machines and nervous systems, the raise of Neural 
Nets and Automata Theory. In what refers to nervous systems organization, the 
ideas of reverberating and closing loops to explain brain activity were established 
there. These ideas generated concepts and theories on circular causality in Econom-
ics and in the polling of public opinion.
Table 1.
Neurocybernetics Subjects from the Macy’s Conferences (1950’s)
* Regulation, homeostasis and goal directed activity
* Transmission of signals and communication
* Neural nets and automata theory
* Closed loops in the central nervous system
* “Circular causality” in economics and the polling of public opinion
* Conflict between motives in psychiatry (heterarchy of values)
* Reverberating and content addressable memories
* Learning as changes in transition probabilities
The analysis of conflict between motives in psychiatry led to the developing of con-
cepts like heterarchyof values in mental processes. Also, the ideas of content ad-
dressable memory, active or reverberating memories and the consideration of learn-
ing as changes in transition probabilities among states, were inspired from Biology 
to became terms applicable to machines. In sum, a considerable and rich flow of 
new ideas and concepts to be applied both to machine and to living systems (see a 
summary in table 1).
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Neurocybernetics evolved with powerful input from the Theory of Communi-
cation of Shannon and key figures in the field of Computer Science such as Von 
Neumann, in the case of the latter, with application to questions of computability, 
performability, capacity for reproduction and reliability of functioning. McCul-
loch and Von Neumann were personal friends. McCulloch delighted a great deal 
in recounting the anecdote of how they began their work together on reliability of 
functioning, probabilistic logic and probabilistic computing.
Table 2.
Later Classical Neurocybernetics Problems
Reliable computation in nets (McCulloch, von Neumann)
Adaptive Systems and Learning (Ashby, von Foerster, Caianiello)
McCulloch’s Programs I and II
(Logical Synthesis: Neuronal Counterparts of Logical Machines)
(“Automata” Synthesis of Nervous Structures)
Connections Neurocybernetics-Artificial Intelligence
McCulloch then held (in the Fifties) the chair of Psychiatry at the University of 
Chicago. One night, he, Von Neumann and some colleagues drunk too much 
whisky. McCulloch suddenly stopped the conversation dead and commented 
something on its effect: “The thresholds of neurones are now very, very low. Nev-
ertheless, neurons are still computing reasonably reliably. What can there be in the 
brain, in its modular structure and links, which makes it such a reliable piece of 
machinery in spite of failure in threshold levels and components?”
A magnificent piece of work called Agathe Tyche: The lucky reckoners offers a fair 
overview of muchof his philosophy with respect to ways of building reliable ma-
chinery from unsafe components. The classic by Cowan called Reliable Computa-
tion in the Presence of Noise and almost all of his later work on reliable computing 
was the result of McCulloch’s expansion of Von Neumann’s original concept.
Master contributions in the 50’s and 60’s include among other Ross Ashby, Heinz 
von Foerster and Eduardo Caianiello. Ashby’s concept of homeostatic machines is 
fundamental for the development of mathematical Cybernetics, as well the ideas 
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developed in his classical book “Design for a Brain”. Von Foerster, was a physicist 
who became cybernetician after serving as secretary to the Macy’s Foundation 
Conferences and editor of the Transactions. His contributions on second order 
cybernetics or cybernetics of observing systems, are crucial to understand complex 
non trivial machines and systems. Third, there are Eduardo Caianiello’s neuronic 
and mnemonic equations for neural dynamics and for learning.
Around 1965, some forty four years back, the office of McCulloch in the Elec-
tronic Research lab at the MIT was a kind of breathtaking classroom both for the 
quality of the science produced and for the incredible people who filed through it. 
All of the greats of Cybernetics were there: Colin Cherry, Donald McKay, Patrick 
Meredith, Von Foerster, Gordon Pask, Eduardo Caianiello, to name only a few. 
Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert set up the MAC project in Artificial Intel-
ligence in a nearby lab. It was a young mathematician, Manuel Blum, who had dis-
covered the theory of neural networks with the interaction of afferents, together 
with another young mathematician, Michael Arbib.
After the problems with respect to the reliability of functioning, which reached 
some acceptable solutions, the theory of neural networks faced up to the question 
of dynamic memory. This problem refers to oscillations in networks, expressly con-
structed to provoke controlled oscillations, which serve as a support to the dynamic 
storage of information. The initial logical problem was to find the maximum theo-
retical number of ways of oscillation in a non-linear, discrete and arbitrary network 
of N formal neurons. Schnabel calculated it and he found it was a number which 
grows extraordinarily when the number of formal neurons is increased. For exam-
ple, for two neurons, there are twenty oscillation modes: for three, there 6.024 ie, 
three neurons could “store” 6.924 different models, each of which could be evoked 
by different external inputs. We say, “it could” because we still have to show that 
a network of fixed anatomy could be designed that incorporates all the modes of 
oscillation. This was proved in 1966 via the theorem of synthesis, using formal neu-
rons with afferent interaction introduced by Blum.
By the year 1969, the theory of formal Neural Networks was considered, from the 
logical perspective, to be a closed matter mainly due to the introduction of the 
so-called functional matrices. They allowed, transparently, the demonstration of 
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equivalence between determinist and probabilistic robots and networks of formal 
neurons with feedback, via constructive theorems. There was only one formal gap, 
discovered in 1977 by a student at the University of Zaragoza and it consisted in the 
fact that certain probabilistic machines had no counterpart in the logical networks 
of formal neurons unless an additional probabilistic codifier was incorporated into 
the network, previous to the input to the networks if unless the “outside” world 
(outside the neural) had a non-deterministic nature and, what is worse, a nature 
which depends on the structure of the network of formal neurons. In other words, 
that there are probabilistic robots which cannot be duplicated in the networks of 
formal neurons with afferent interaction. In fact and in the practical totality of the 
applications, the subject is not completely relevant. But from the theoretical per-
spective, it is inadmissible since we could not defend that the logical model of Mc-
Culloch and Pitts was an appropriate model to represent the activity of the brain at 
the computational level of coding and communication.
This gap was acknowledged, but the subject was parked due to the fact that neural 
networks suffered a fall in scientific interest from the end of the Seventies through 
to the mid Eighties. In 1983, a doctorate student in Maths, took up the subject again 
and proved that, if interaction between axons was admitted - the output channels 
of the neurons - in an intercommunication process which may take place through 
the medium, in a network of hierarchizised formal neurons, then the theory was 
complete i.e., a network of formal neurons with feedback would duplicate any ar-
bitrary robot, be it deterministic, probabilistic or non-deterministic. This effect of 
output interaction was added elegantly to the interaction of afferents (inputs) of 
Blum dating back to 1962. This finishes the so called McCulloch’s Program 1, the 
Logical Program.
McCulloch’s Program II is more realistic and can be considered as brain theory at 
the level of Systems Sciences. The prototype paper is the 1947 paper by McCulloch 
and Pitts entitled ”How we know Universals”, as well as his and Kilmer’s subse-
quent work on modelling the reticular formation. Actually, as Norbert Wiener says 
in the Introduction to his book Cybernetics, McCulloch was after an apparatus to 
read aloud a printed page, which, because the necessary invariances, was a definite 
analogue to the problem of Gestalt’s form perception. He designed a device that 
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made von Bonin ask if it was a diagram of the fourth layer of the visual cortex. A 
typical neurocybernetic solution.
Program II can be simply stated as follows: from a subsystem of the nervous sys-
tem, define the most precisely its functions and try to find a cooperative, reliable 
granular structure to perform said functions. That will be a true theoretical neural 
net. Program II can be formulated for the artificial as well, so that it provides for 
systematic reasonable ways to solve problems by means of artificial “neural nets” of 
computing modules (see figure 4).
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Figure 4. Proceeding according McCulloch’s Program II
As it is known, in the Eighties, there was an upsurge in neural computing which, I 
believe, was due to one basic cause: the growing availability of microcomputers at 
a very low cost so that hundreds and even thousands of them could be linked up 
in parallel processing networks each with functions much more complex than the 
formal neurons of McCulloch and Pitts and the addenda. Anyway, we should not 
forget the fact that the classic theory is complete at a logical level and by offering 
greater computing potential to the basic units, the maximum we arrive at is a reduc-
tion in the number of units needed for the practical working of an artificial system 
apart from an increase in the speed of design. The only crucial element which had 
not been contemplated and which was easy to incorporate - and was incorporated 
in the famous Perceptrons of the 60s - was the capacity of modification of synaptic 
weighting through learning.
As it is well known, this resurgence of neural networks as systems of distributed 
granular computing is finding application in technological fields ranging from 
processing and treatment of signals (voice, image), systems of artificial vision, in 
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robots and in control. We however believe that most works on artificial neural nets 
are irrelevant ways of solving problems using non-optimal tools. It is our believe 
that significant progress in artificial neural net theory (or modular distributed 
computation) requires to proceed strictly according McCulloch’s Program II.
3. From Neurocybernetics to Bioinspired Artificial Intelligence
The aims of Neurocybernetics are essentially the understanding of neural behav-
iour at different levels, by constructing models and theories. If we add the obvious 
condition that these models and theories are computable, in order to embody them 
in a physical structure, we can conclude that these are also the aims of the so more 
recently called Computational Neuroscience. Thus the range in what Neurocyber-
netics acts goes from membrane phenomena to perceptual and cognitive, and to 
behavioural and social processes.
The neural function is a really complex phenomenon and its characterization re-
quires, as a norm, meticulous approaches both at the level of tools and methods to 
be applied as in accepting or choosing the parameters which are considered neces-
sary when describing and trying to explain this function. Also care should be tak-
en when considering the scope of possible validity of conclusions reached via the 
theoretical and experimental approaches adopted. This is equivalent to saying that 
any theory with respect to the nervous system is limited a priori by the conceptual 
tools. To exaggerate, we should not attempt to explain the capacity for resolution of 
problems of the nervous system using, for example, non-linear differential-integral 
equations. Nor can we delve deeper into the properties of the neural membrane us-
ing the logic of relationships.
Thus, we cannot deny the historic role played of action potential registration from 
the Fifties since they have allowed for a physical knowledge of the carrier substra-
tum of messages. But it is illegitimate to work from them to deduce high level 
properties or to try to build functional models of the brain. It would be, albeit an 
unfair comparison, like using statistics of the pulses which appear in a data bus or 
computer commands to deduce the algorithmic base of the programme solving a 
problem in RAM. 
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We can sum up this structure of Neurocybernetics levels in a way which indicates 
what are the appropriate tools for each level, keeping in mind that a notable change 
in level cannot be allowed in the theory without changing tools. But, if prudent, in 
the practical research into the brain and artificial machines which we wish to make 
work like the brain, we can skip the level slightly.
The most basic level (where computational machines still do not appear, strictly, 
apart from as tools) is the level of the neurotransmitters, membrane phenomena 
and action potentials. Tools present in this level are Biochemistry and Biophysics. 
Then comes Biophysics of Neural codes and multiple codes, where this is a word 
used in neurophysiology to indicate multiplex. Then we move onto Biophysics and 
Signal Processing. We continue through sensorial codes, decodification in effec-
tors - motor and glandular action - and the code of advanced peripheral neurons 
such as the ganglion cells in the retina. We are now in the realm of Signal Theory 
almost at the level of logic. Then, we have the neural net level, the interaction of 
input and output of the neurons themselves, and the coordination of the output 
-effectors. We are now at the level of the Language of Logic bordering on Symbolic 
Languages and, finally, we come to the central cortex neural code, the cooperative 
processes between masses of brain tissue, the extraction of Universals and the social 
processes of interaction between neuron masses. We are at the level of Symbolic 
language. The structure in levels is summarized in table 3. Upper square bounds the 
more classical formal tools of computational neuroscience. Lower square bounds 
techniques close to Artificial Intelligence tools.
Following Mira and Delgado three main subdomains can be distinguished in the 
broad domain of Artificial Intelligence (AI), as shown in figure 5. The actions of 
Neurocybernetics and Computational Neuroscience show up in going to and from 
Bioinspired AI, that is the understanding of cognitive processes, from and to the 
more practical knowledge engineering techniques, dealing with tasks and methods. 
Influencing both are the more classical Artificial Intelligence concepts and meth-
ods, an optimistic line of thought originated in 1956, when the term Artificial In-
telligence was coined. Some times it is 
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Table 3.
called Good Old Fashion AI Representations (GOFAIR). This diagram provides 
for a clarifying picture of the place and role of Neurocybernetics and Computa-
tional Neuroscience in a modern post-graduate educational plan for Artificial In-
telligence.
Figure 5. Subdomains of the domain Artificial Intelligence and the place of Neurocyber-
netics as a link.
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In return, there are at least three paradigms of AI which are incident in the con-
cepts and methods of Neurocybernetics. This paradigms project back to the three 
basic original components of Neurocybernetics cited in section 2. First, there is the 
Symbolic Paradigm, which is actually an updated view of Craick’s proposal, corre-
sponding to Symbolic Agents AI. Here, a Knowledge Base houses the model of the 
environment, which is to be updated with data coming from the sensory lower level 
representations and from the coded motor actions prior to the executions on the 
environment. Planning and inferences are operated by the sensory representations 
and by the present model of the environment, to act on said model and the coding 
of output actions. This is illustrated in figure 6.
Figure 6. Updated view of Craick’s proposal (Symbolic Agent A.I.)
The second AI paradigm incident in Neurocybernetics is the situated AI paradigm 
which corresponds to the so called Intelligence Agents. Its basic concepts can be 
traced back to Wiener’s purposive behaviour cited in section 2. Here, the kernel of 
the situated intelligence agent is a kind of finite learning automaton, holding as-
sociation tables, capable of reactive and conditional coding of elementary actions. 
The inputs to this association computer are the results of perceptual transforms of 
the sensory data. The output feeds the computation of chains of actions to go to the 
effectors. Notice that the main feedback loop controlling the system is an external 
one, determined by the situation of the agent in the environment. This type of ar-
chitecture is illustrated in figure 7.
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Figure 7. Architecture of a Situated I.A.System (Intelligent Agent).
Finally, there is the Connectivistic Paradigm, which sprung from the original Mc-
Culloch and Pitts paper and the later Perceptrons and Artificial Neural Nets. Here, 
though we are far from the original meaning given to formal neurons in 1943 and 
to posterior work of McCulloch and collaborators, it is typically accepted that 
networks of artificial neurons (many of them, variants of Perceptrons) are capable 
of solving classes of Artificial Intelligence problems in a distributed, granular way. 
This claim is actually based on the two basic and very important translating opera-
tions performed by the human operator, external to the net: an abstraction of the 
observed data to generate numerical labelled variables (or input lines) and a re-
translation of numerical solutions on output labelled lines or variables into a subset 
of the natural language, to provide classes in which fit the original observed data. 
In between, an ANN (Artificial Neural Network) is actually a parametric numeri-
cal associator which can learn (modify weights), having the nature of a multilayer 
Perceptron. The typical connectivistic Artificial Intelligence architecture is shown 
in figure 8.
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Figure 8. Typical Connectivistic A.I. Application Architecture of an Artificial Neural Net.
As it can be immediately concluded, artificial neural nets as they are nowadays un-
derstood do not provide for theories or models of the nervous systems, but rather 
are a pure computing tool, that should always be compared with other for for the 
solution of specific problems.
As a synthesis of the aims of neurocybernetics and of Bioinspired AI, we shall refer 
to a diagram which reflects Jos´e Mira’s desires of bringing together Neuroscience 
and AI, in an effort to clarify and to increase our understanding of the nervous 
system. And also, to develop better and more sophisticated computing tools in our 
benefits. The diagram is shown in figure 9. On the left, there are the different lev-
els of description corresponding to the structures and components. At the right, 
a similar representation for the same levels corresponding to neural processes. In 
both cases, arrows coming down mean reductionistic approaches, while arrows up 
would reflect emergent properties. Notice that each reduction and apparent emer-
gency requires a change in the formal language and in the interpretations by the 
external observer. Much care must be taken in the jumps between levels, as it was 
also the case for the levels and formal tools in Neurocybernetics (Table 3). Trying 
to describe and explain cognitive processes in terms of neurons and neural nets 
languages is too irrealistic, a jump similar to trying to describe the Theory of Com-
putation or Data Structures and Algorithms in terms of hardware.
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Bridging the formal tools and concepts of the two columns of the diagram at each 
level is an important task ahead for neuroscience and computing researchers. This 
was the aim of Jos´e Mira; it is the aim of the congresses IWINAC (International 
WorkConference on the Interplay between Natural and Artificial Computation) 
that Mira initiated, and are the aims of many of us. We hope that the brilliant past 
of Neurocybernetics will project into a brilliant and useful research and education-
al future.
Figure 9. Bridging Computing Science and Neuroscience.
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